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Abstract
Organisations increasingly use the Internet to offer their
own services and to utilise the services of others. This nat-
urally leads to information sharing across organisational
boundaries. However, despite the requirement to share in-
formation, the autonomy and privacy requirements of or-
ganisations must not be compromised. This demands the
strict policing of inter-organisational interactions. Thus
there is a requirement for dependable mechanisms for in-
formation sharing between organisations that do not nec-
essarily trust each other. The paper describes the design
of a novel distributed object middleware that guarantees
both safety and liveness in this context. The safety prop-
erty ensures that local policies are not compromised despite
failures and/or misbehaviour by other parties. The liveness
property ensures that, if no party misbehaves, agreed inter-
actions will take place despite a bounded number of tem-
porary network and computer related failures. The paper
describes a prototype implementation with example appli-
cations.
1. Introduction
Organisations increasingly use the Internet to offer their
own services and to utilise the services of others. This natu-
rally leads to multi-party information sharing across organ-
isational boundaries. A trend that is reinforced by concen-
tration on core business and the “out-sourcing” of non-core
operations to external organisations. However, despite the
requirement to share information, the autonomy and privacy
requirements of organisations must not be compromised.
This demands the strict policing of inter-organisational in-
teractions. Thus the requirement is for dependable mech-
anisms for information sharing between organisations that
do not necessarily trust each other.
This paper describes the design of a novel distributed ob-
ject middleware that guarantees both safety and liveness in
the above context. It is assumed that each organisation has a
local set of policies for information sharing that is consistent
with the overall information sharing agreement (business
contract) between the organisations. The safety property
ensures that local policies of an organisation are not com-
promised despite failures and/or misbehaviour by other par-
ties. In essence, the middleware facilitates regulated infor-
mation sharing through multi-party coordination protocols
for non-repudiable access to and validation of shared state.
The liveness property ensures that, if no party misbehaves,
agreed interactions will take place despite a bounded num-
ber of temporary network and computer related failures.
Section 2 sketches three scenarios from which require-
ments are derived. Section 3 provides an overview of the
distributed object middleware we call B2BObjects1. Coor-
dination protocols are discussed in detail in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 presents the Application Programmer Interface (API),
a prototype implementation and two proof-of-concept ap-
plications that use it. Related work is surveyed in Section 6.
The paper concludes with a discussion of future work.
2. Application requirements
In this section we sketch three different application sce-
narios from which we derive requirements on middleware
support for dependable information sharing between organ-
isations.
1. Order processing. The process of ordering goods or ser-
vices includes: requisition; agreement; delivery and pay-
ment. The process must be validated to ensure that organi-
sational policy is adhered to (for example, that a customer is
credit-worthy) and that agreements between the parties are
observed (for example, that the supplier does not arbitrarily
modify an order). There is also a requirement that payment
1subject of a patent application by Hewlett Packard
1
is made if and only if the items or services ordered are de-
livered. For simple orders, this last aspect of the process
is the most significant. When the ordering process is more
complex, requisition and agreement can acquire greater sig-
nificance. Requisition may include a procurement process
involving multiple parties; there may be a need to negotiate
non-standard terms and conditions; order fulfillment may
entail commitments from more than one supplier or from
delivery agents; or the order may govern delivery of an on-
going service that should itself be regulated. In these cases
it can be argued that business is better supported if the or-
ganisations involved are able to share the order and related
agreements. This requires that all interested parties validate
updates to the shared information.
2. Dispersal of operational support to the customer.
In the telecommunications industry, Operational Support
Systems (OSS) manage service configuration and fault-
handling on the customer’s behalf [9]. For the most part, ex-
isting OSS are monolithic and centralised. Customers have
little or no direct control over critical business processes that
are carried out for them by the service provider. With the
advent of more sophisticated services, the customer needs
to be able to tailor their complete service. This requires the
“dispersal of OSS” so that the customer controls the aspects
that logically belong to them. The resultant devolution of
processes and information allows business relationships to
evolve to the benefit of all involved. To fulfill this promise,
there is a requirement for regulated information sharing be-
tween the organisations.
3. Distributed auction service. In this scenario, au-
tonomous, geographically dispersed auction houses wish to
collaborate to deliver a trusted, distributed auction service
to their clients (buyers and sellers). The clients act upon
the state of an auction through servers that are controlled
by the auction houses. These servers share and update auc-
tion state. The clients expect the service to guarantee the
same chance of a successful outcome irrespective of which
individual server is used. In effect, the auction houses are
providing a distributed trusted third party (TTP) service to
deliver a regulated market-place for buyers and sellers. The
auction houses wish to maintain a long-lived, successful
service and, therefore, continued interaction.
Each of the above examples entails multi-party interac-
tion and information sharing. For each party the overarch-
ing requirements are: (i) that their own actions on shared in-
formation meet locally determined, evaluated and enforced
policy; and that their legitimate actions are acknowledged
and accepted by the other parties; and (ii) that the actions
of the other parties comply with agreed rules and are ir-
refutably attributable to those parties. These requirements
imply the collection, and verification, of non-repudiable ev-
idence of the actions of parties who share and update infor-
mation. If middleware is provided that presents the abstrac-
tion of shared (interaction) state, then the requirements can
be met by regulating, and recording, access and update to
that state.
Figure 1 shows two interaction styles. In the first (1a), or-
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Figure 1. Direct vs. indirect interaction styles
ganisations (Org

) disclose state and interact directly. In the
second (1b), state disclosure is conditional and interaction
is conducted via trusted agents (TA

). It is possible to envis-
age circumstances where both styles will be used: there may
be an initial direct interaction to agree trusted agents before
continuing the interaction through those agents; or relation-
ships between organisations may change in such a way that
indirect interaction evolves to direct interaction. The dotted
clouds in Figure 1 represent the deployment of B2BObjects
middleware to meet the application requirements outlined
above. For simplicity, in the rest of the paper direct interac-
tion (1a) is assumed unless stated otherwise.
3. Overview of B2BObjects middleware
This section gives an overview of the B2BObjects mid-
dleware that is designed to address the requirement for in-
formation sharing between organisations. Detailed discus-
sion of coordination protocols is deferred to Section 4. The
API and a prototype implementation are described in Sec-
tion 5.
B2BObjects provides non-repudiable coordination of the
state of object replicas. State changes are subject to a locally
evaluated validation process. State validation is application-
specific and may be arbitrarily complex (and may involve
back-end processes at each organisation). Coordination
protocols provide multi-party agreement on access to and
validation of state. As shown in Figure 2, the logical view
of shared objects in a virtual space (2a) is realised by the
regulated coordination of actions on object replicas held at
each organisation (2b).
Multi-party validation of state changes supports the no-
tion of the “joint ownership” of shared state. A state change
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Figure 2. B2BObjects interaction
proposal comprises the new state and the proposer’s signa-
ture on that state. The proposal is dispatched to all other
parties for local validation. Each recipient produces a re-
sponse comprising a signed receipt and a signed decision
on the (local) validity of the state change. All parties re-
ceive each response and a new state is valid if the collective
decision is unanimous agreement to the change. The sign-
ing of evidence generated during state validation binds the
evidence to the relevant key-holder. Evidence is stored sys-
tematically in local non-repudiation logs.
B2BObjects supports the evolution of enterprise appli-
cations to inter-organisation applications. Although an ob-
ject’s implementation is augmented, the application-level
use of the object may remain unchanged. Figure 3 de-
picts this augmentation of an application object. Calls to
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Figure 3. B2BObjects augmentation
the object are mediated by the middleware. The intra-
enterprise object invocation mechanism provides an inter-
nal interface to the object that guarantees that state changes
are coordinated with other organisations through the inter-
organisation object invocation mechanism. Systematic
check-pointing of object state upon installation of a newly-
validated state allows recovery in the event of general fail-
ures and rollback in the event of invalidation. The certificate
management and non-repudiation services provide: authen-
tication of access to objects; verification of signatures to ac-
tions on objects; and logging of evidence of those actions.
In summary, augmentation with B2BObjects provides: con-
nection authentication and management; coordination and
validation of state changes; persistence of both validated ob-
ject state and of the information required to reach validation
decisions; and the logging of non-repudiation evidence.
The careful separation of concerns means that the mid-
dleware can be configured to different application require-
ments; to suit a variety of interaction styles; and to use dif-
ferent underlying services (for example, to operate in syn-
chronous, deferred synchronous or asynchronous commu-
nication modes).
4. B2BObjects coordination protocols
This section provides a detailed discussion of the state
coordination protocol at the heart of B2BObjects. A dis-
cussion of the guarantees provided by the protocol is fol-
lowed by the assumptions and notation that apply to its de-
scription. The protocol description includes modifications
to protocol messages to validate update to, as opposed to
overwrite of, object state. An informal analysis of protocol
vulnerabilities follows the description. The discussion is in
terms of a single object but applies just as well to the use
of a composite object to coordinate the states of multiple
objects.
The middleware also uses connection and disconnection
protocols to manage membership of the group that has ac-
cess to an object. These protocols are described in Sec-
tion 4.5.
4.1. Protocol guarantees
The state coordination protocol regulates overwrites to
the state of object replicas by validating state transitions. A
proposed new state is valid if all parties who share the object
have validated the transition to that state. A proposed state
is invalid if any party has invalidated (vetoed) the transi-
tion. The notion of valid state is necessarily self-contained:
a state is valid if it has been unanimously agreed; invalid
otherwise.
The guarantees offered by the protocol relate to reach-
ing agreement on a state transition; to the inability to mis-
represent that agreement; and, therefore, to the inability to
misrepresent the validity of object state. The safety guaran-
tee is that invalid state cannot under any circumstances be
imposed on a local object replica and that evidence is gen-
erated to ensure that the actions of honest parties cannot be
misrepresented by dishonest parties. If all parties behave
correctly, liveness is guaranteed despite a bounded number
of temporary failures. The protocol generates evidence to
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detect misbehaviour. It is assumed that, if necessary, this
evidence can be used in extra-protocol arbitration to resolve
disputes. Specific guarantees are detailed after clarifying
what the protocol does not guarantee.
 Amongst the parties who share an object, there is no
protection against the disclosure of a proposed state
change to the object. State must be disclosed to be val-
idated. As illustrated in Figure 1b, trusted agents can
be used to provide conditional state disclosure. An ex-
ample of this type of interaction is given in Section 5.1.
 There is no guarantee of termination when parties mis-
behave. The protocol is concerned both with verifi-
cation of the integrity of messages and with the se-
mantic validation of message content (a proposed state
change). This exacerbates the problem of guaranteeing
termination since, for example, we do not deduce any-
thing about the validity of a state change from a failure
to respond to a proposal. The protocol is designed to
generate the evidence necessary for application-level
resolution of the resultant blocking. The provision of
stronger termination guarantees is discussed in Sec-
tion 7.
The specific guarantees are:
 that a state transition proposal is irrefutably bound to
its source and to the decisions of the parties validating
the proposal; and that those decisions cannot be mis-
represented and are irrefutably bound to their source;
 that irrefutable evidence of who participated in a pro-
tocol is generated;
 that no party can misrepresent the validity of object
state, either by claiming that an invalid (vetoed) state
is valid or that a valid (unanimously agreed) state is
invalid; and
 that the protocol is fail-safe: faults or misbehaviour
may result in the abort or blocking of a protocol run
but cannot result in the installation of invalid object
state at a correctly behaving party.
4.2. Assumptions and notation
It is assumed that the communications infrastructure pro-
vides eventual, once-only message delivery. If the under-
lying communications system does not support these se-
mantics then the coordination middleware masks this and
presents the assumed semantics. There is no requirement
for the communications system to order messages. Network
partitions are assumed to heal eventually. Nodes may crash
but it is assumed that they will eventually recover and re-
sume participation in a protocol run. For non-repudiation,
and recovery, protocol messages are held in local persistent
storage at sender and recipient.
To generate non-repudiation evidence, each party has ac-
cess to the following cryptographic primitives [11]: a sig-
nature scheme such that signature 

 by  on data 
is both verifiable and unforgeable; a secure (one-way and
collision-resistant) hash function, ; and a secure pseudo-
random sequence generator to generate statistically random
and unpredictable sequences of bits. All parties are as-
sumed to have the means to verify each other’s signatures.
Since a signature is only valid if it can be asserted that the
signing key was not compromised at the time of use, all
signed evidence must be time-stamped [15]. It is assumed
that a trusted time-stamping service, or services, acceptable
to all parties is available to each party to generate time-
stamps. Given a message   	
 

	 by party
, a time-stamping service, , will provide the follow-
ing time-stamp as evidence of its generation at time 

:



 


 

. For brevity, time-stamps are not
shown in protocol descriptions.
The different roles in -party coordination of shared ob-
ject state are distinguished as follows:
  

      is the set of participants


  is a proposer of new state


 

         is the set of
recipients of 

’s proposal


is the group identifier of  as viewed by


. It is computed when the membership of
 changes (see Section 4.5). Inconsistent
group identifiers lead to invalidation of a pro-
posal.
The state of an object is uniquely identified by a tuple:

   
  ; where  is a proposal se-
quence number,   is a hash of a random number, and
  is a hash of the state to which the tuple refers. All
of these are generated locally by the proposer. The pro-
poser creates a new sequence number by incrementing the
sequence number of the last known coordination request.
Thus, the sequence number of any proposed state is guaran-
teed to be greater than that of any agreed state and of any
coordination request seen by the proposer. The combination
of sequence number and hash of the random number disam-
biguates concurrent proposals and guarantees the unique-
ness of the tuple. The hash of the state binds the tuple to the
state identified to enable checks on the integrity of the tuple
with respect to that state.
There are three tuples of interest:


 
  

 
  

 is the tu-
ple that identifies the new state, 

, pro-
posed by 

(

is a random number gener-
ated by 

)
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

is the tuple that identifies the agreed state,


, as viewed by 



is the tuple that identifies the current
state, 

, as viewed by 

To ensure ordered state transitions, the following invariants
should hold during a protocol run:
1. for 

: 

 

 

(their current
state is the agreed state as viewed by themselves and
by 

)
2. for 

: 

 

(its current state is the pro-
posed state)
3. for : 

  

 (which fol-
lows from generation of  and invariant 1)
4. for : 

is unique for all proposals seen
Breaches of these invariants are detected during a protocol
run and lead to invalidation of a proposed state transition.
The following notation is used in addition to the above:


 is 

’s signature on value 


is 

’s decision on the validity of a state
transition proposed by 

. A decision is ac-
cept or reject plus optional diagnostic infor-
mation. 

is used as shorthand for 

if
the proposal to which it relates is unambigu-
ous. (

is, by definition, accept.)


	 

  means 

sends message 
to each member of 



	 

 

means each member, 

, of


sends a message of type  to 




is the concatenation of a set of messages,
or parts of messages, of type 
4.3. Protocol description
In essence, the state coordination protocol provides non-
repudiable two-phase commit. However, the messages ex-
changed have a richer semantics than could be derived from
simply signing and counter-signing two-phase commit mes-
sages. The proposer is committed to acceptance of the new
state at initiation of a protocol run. 

cannot later unilat-
erally reject the state transition. A state transition is only
rejected if it is vetoed by one or more members of 

.
The final commit message represents more than 

’s con-
firmation of whether to accept or reject the new state. It is
the non-repudiable decision of  on the validity of the
proposed state transition. The protocol has three steps:
 

	 

 
 

	 

 

 

	 

 
where 
  
 


 

 
  


 


 


 




 


 

 

 
 

 


 


 


 


 


 


  


  







Message  comprises: a proposal, the proposed new
state and 

’s signature on the proposal. A proposal identi-
fies 

and  (to verify a consistent view of the group),
and specifies the proposed state transition from 

to


.  

, sent as part of 

, is 

’s commitment
to the random authenticator, 

, of the group’s decision.
Message 

is a receipt from 

for the proposal and
a signed decision, 

, on its validity. Inclusion of 

,


and 

permits systematic consistency checks.
The hash  

 represents 

’s assertion of the integrity
(or otherwise) of 

with respect to the hash sent as part
of 

.
Message is the aggregation of all decisions and of the
non-repudiation evidence in the form of signed proposals
and responses. Any party can compute the group’s decision
over



and .  requires no signature since
only 

can produce the authenticator 

.  is linked
to the other messages in the same protocol run through the
authenticator and the concatenated, signed responses.
’s authenticated decision on 

’s proposal is:



 









 




 


             
This is non-repudiable evidence of acceptance or rejection
of a proposed state transition and of the consistency, or oth-
erwise, of the information provided during a protocol run.
A successful protocol run allows the consistent installation
of a new, validated object state at all replicas. An unsuc-
cessful run results in the consistent view that a proposed
state is invalid. In this case, the replicas remain in the state
last agreed by all parties (and the proposer can rollback to
that state).
4.3.1 Modifications for state update
To allow for update to, as opposed to overwrite of, object
state, the propose and respond messages are modified as fol-
lows:
  
  


 

 
  


 


 


 


   




 


 


 


 


 


   


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In message, the update, 

, is provided along with the
hash   

. A hash of the new state, after application of
 

, is still provided as part of 

. It is therefore pos-
sible for members of  to determine that, if the update
is agreed and applied, a consistent new state will result.
4.4. Protocol analysis
We now present an informal analysis to support the as-
sertion of the safety guarantee in Section 4.1. To deliver the
guarantee, the protocol must withstand subversion by mem-
bers of , whether through deliberate or accidental fault,
as well as by intruders.
Any attempt to subvert a protocol run by generating in-
consistent message content can be detected. In which case,
the proposed state transition is invalidated and irrefutable
evidence of misbehaviour is generated. It is possible to ver-
ify that the signed parts of protocol messages are consistent
with the unsigned parts and, therefore, to detect internally
inconsistent messages. It is possible to detect inconsistency
between messages because all messages are linked to their
predecessor(s) in a protocol run. 

provides a unique
label for each protocol run that is linked to each message in
the run. It is therefore possible to detect any attempt to re-
play messages from a prior run. (Note: uniqueness refers to
the tuple that identifies a state proposal 

 and not to
the proposed state 

 — it may be legitimate to propose
the re-installation of an earlier state.) We now show how the
protocol allows detection of other attempts at subversion by
members of :
 A member of  omits to send a message: If 

does
not send  then, by definition, 

is unable to show
that the new state is valid. If a member, 

, of 

does not send

, then 

will have obtained the pro-
posed new state without providing non-repudiable evi-
dence of its receipt but cannot demonstrate the validity
of the state. If 

fails to send , then 

will know,
and can act upon, the group’s decision but all mem-
bers of 

hold evidence that the protocol run is
active. Any subsequent coordination request (whether
connection, disconnection or state change) will reveal
inconsistencies between state identifier tuples.
 

selectively sends to members of 

: If different
messages are sent to different members of 

, then
the inconsistency will be detected in subsequent proto-
col steps. If  is not sent to a subset of 

, then
it is not possible to reach a unanimous decision on the
validity of the proposed state and 

cannot produce a
valid  for any member of 

. If  is not sent
to a subset of

, then this subset can show that the
protocol run is still active. Further, any honest party
who receives  can relay it to any other member of


. Selective sending by 

can be prevented if
multicast semantics are guaranteed. In the absence of
such a guarantee, members of 

can detect selec-
tive sending.
 

proposes a null state transition: On receipt of 
any member of

can detect that

 

and
can reject a null state transition.
Assuming signatures are not compromised, the non-
repudiation evidence generated during a protocol run binds
a party to their actions (good or bad) and those actions can-
not be misrepresented. An intruder in control of a member
of  can act as a misbehaving party as outlined above.
In no case can a correctly behaving party be forced to agree
(and install) an invalid state.
With insecure channels between members of , the
well-known Dolev-Yao intruder [6] (who has full control
over the network but cannot perform cryptanalysis) can ob-
tain complete knowledge of proposed object state and of
decisions with respect to proposals. In addition, they are
able to modify the unsigned parts of any message. This
results in inconsistent message content (dealt with above).
Given secure channels between members of , this in-
truder can only remove, delay or replay messages. With or
without secure channels, it is not possible to undetectably
modify messages between members of  and no mem-
ber of  can be forced to agree invalid state. Thus the
most that can be achieved is the detectable disruption of the
protocol (including the blocking of a protocol run pending
receipt of messages). In particular, inconsistency between
signed and unsigned message content is detectable and will
lead to exceptional abort of a protocol and invalidation of a
proposed state change.
At the end of a protocol run a correctly behaving party
will either: (i) be able to install a new, valid object state, and
hold evidence that it has been unanimously agreed; or (ii)
hold evidence that the proposed state transition has been ve-
toed. A misbehaving party may locally install invalid state
but is not able to misrepresent it as valid. Similarly, they
cannot support a claim that valid (unanimously agreed) state
is invalid. A misbehaving party may prevent termination of
a protocol run. This must be resolved at the application
level by, for example, using the evidence generated to in-
voke a dispute resolution procedure.
4.5. Connection and disconnection protocols
This section describes the connection and disconnection
protocols used to manage membership of the participant set,
, for object coordination. The protocols ensure that
at membership changes, all parties have a consistent, non-
repudiable view both of the current membership of 
and of the agreed object state.
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4.5.1 Subject and sponsor roles
There are two special roles in the connection/disconnection
protocols:
1. the subject of a connection or disconnection request
— the proposed new member or the member leaving,
respectively.
2. the sponsor of a connection or disconnection request.
The sponsor coordinates the decision of the current
membership of  with respect to the request. If a
connection request is agreed, the sponsor provides the
current agreed object state to the subject of the request.
The sponsor is also responsible for blocking new coor-
dination requests pending decision on any active re-
quest.
The sponsor of a connection request is unambiguously iden-
tified as the most recently joined member of  That
is, given  members of   

     ordered
by most recently joined member, the sponsor of the cur-
rent connection request is 
	
. If the connection request is
agreed, then the sponsor of the next request will be 
	
.
Any member of  can identify the legitimate sponsor
for a connection request and provide this information to the
subject of a request.
The sponsor of a disconnection request is 
	
unless 
	
is the subject of the request. If 
	
is the subject, then 
	
is the sponsor — the most recently connected member prior
to 
	
.
The use of a sponsor during connection reduces the in-
formation gained by the subject in the event of a request
being rejected. In the case of disconnection, the use of a
sponsor limits the participation of the subject. If a subject is
to be evicted from , then the sponsor may initiate the
disconnection protocol without their involvement. Rotating
the responsibility of sponsor reduces reliance on a single
member of 2. Since the current sponsor can be un-
ambiguously identified, any member of  can verify the
legitimate sponsor for a request and the sponsor is able to
enforce concurrency control during membership changes.
4.5.2 Group identifiers
The membership of  is uniquely identified by a group
identifier tuple: 
   
  



.  and
  are generated in the same way as for state change
proposals.  



 is a hash over the members of .
There are two tuples of interest:
2If sponsor rotation is not required, then the initial member of  can
sponsor all connection/disconnection requests unless they are the subject
of a disconnection request (in this case the responsibility would pass to the
next oldest member of ).
  
  
	
 
  



 is the tu-
ple that identifies the new group that would
result from the proposed membership change.
The sponsor of a connection/disconnection
request generates.


is the tuple that identifies the current group
membership as viewed by 

. Inconsistent
group identifiers lead to invalidation of a pro-
posal.
4.5.3 The connection protocol
In the protocol description below, the participant identifier,


, is assumed to provide access to the information neces-
sary both to establish a connection with 

and to verify


’s signature. 

represents 

’s decision on the validity
of a connection request sponsored by 
	
.
The proposed new member, 
	
, initiates the connec-
tion protocol by sending a request to 
	
. 
	
then relays
the request to 
	
 
 
	
 to obtain the group’s
decision. A random number, 
	
, generated by 
	
uniquely labels the initial request. 
	
is assumed to
have access to the information necessary to communicate
with 
	
. Assuming the connection request is unanimously
agreed, the protocol proceeds as follows:
! 
	
	 
	
 
 
	
 
 
	
	 
	
 
 
	
	 
	
 

 
	
	 
	
 


	
	 
	
 

where 
  
	

 
	

  
 
	
  
 
	
 
  
	

 
 
	

 
 
	



 


 

 

 
 

 


 


 


 


 







	










 

 




 



 


 
	

 
 
	
 
An authenticated decision to agree to the connection of

	
is given by:

	

 







	
 




 




 


          
 
At successful completion of the protocol, the member-
ship of the object coordination group is:  
	
. All
members of this group have evidence of unanimous agree-
ment to admit 
	
. 
	
has also acquired the agreed
state,
	
, and this agreed state can be verified against each
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of the signed agreed state tuple, 

, supplied by mem-
bers of  Thus a consistent view of the membership,
identified by , is installed by all parties.
A connection request from 
	
may be rejected imme-
diately by the sponsor, 
	
, or may be vetoed by a member
of 
	
. In the case of immediate rejection, 
	
simply
responds to a request with a signed reject message:
! 
	
	 
	
 
 
	
 
 
	
	 
	
 

where 


 
	

 "#
 
	
 
	

 "# 
 
	
 
and"# indicates the request
 
 was rejected
In the case of veto by a member of 
	
, the proto-
col follows the same steps as for a successful run except
the final message, 

, is replaced by 

. That is, 
	
learns no more information than in the case of immediate
rejection by 
	
. Message 

is still sent to all members
of 
	
. As can be seen, the sponsor has an advantage
since, from the perspective of the proposed new member,
there is no distinction between immediate rejection by 
	
or rejection by any number of members of . How-
ever, it is assumed that some advantage accrues to all mem-
bers of  from the legitimate involvement of 
	
and,
therefore, that there is an incentive to cooperate and include

	
in the interaction [2]. The unwillingness of any mem-
ber of  to admit a new member must ultimately be the
subject of extra-protocol dispute resolution. The protocol as
presented meets the requirement of providing a consistent,
non-repudiable view of membership changes.
4.5.4 The disconnection protocols
Disconnection protocols are required both for voluntary dis-
connection and for eviction of a member of .
We assume 

is the subject of a disconnection request,

	
is the current request sponsor and 

is the proposer.
For voluntary disconnection: 

 

; and for eviction:


 

(and may be 
	
). The disconnection protocols
aim to ensure that the remaining members of the object co-
ordination group have evidence of the decision to discon-
nect 

and that, in the case of voluntary disconnection, 

initiated the disconnection. 
	
 
	

 

is the re-
cipient set for a disconnection proposal sponsored by 
	
.
For eviction, 

represents 

’s decision on the validity of
the eviction request. Since any member of  wishing to
disconnect may in practice simply cease cooperation, vol-
untary disconnection cannot be vetoed. Thus,

is omitted
from the voluntary disconnection protocol.
The eviction protocol is:
! 

	 
	
 
 

 
 
	
	 

	
 
 

	
	 
	
 

 
	
	 

	
 
where 
  


 


 


  
 
	
  
 

 
  
	

 
 
	

 
	

 
 
	



 


 

 

 
 

 


 


 


 


 


 


	










 

 




 

An authenticated eviction decision is given by:

	

 








  




 




 


          
     
If the current sponsor is also the proposer of an eviction


 
	
, the request step is omitted from the above pro-
tocol and message  is modified as follows:
  
 
	
 
  
	

 


 
	

 
 
	

It is possible to modify the eviction protocol to allow for
eviction of subsets of and arrive at cooperating subsets
that may make forward progress. In this case, an evictee
subset, ", is identified at the request stage instead of a
single member of . If the eviction is agreed, a new
coordination group is formed:  
 ". Clearly, dis-
tinct subgroups can be formed in this way. A group formed
following eviction(s) can only claim that its members have
agreed to its formation. No claim can be made with respect
to the agreement of the evictee(s) to the new group member-
ship nor to the validity of subsequent state updates agreed
by the new group.
The voluntary disconnection protocol is:
! 

	 
	
 
 

 
 
	
	 

	
 
 

	
	 
	
 

 
	
	 

	
 

	
	 

 
 
 
	
 
where 
  


 


  
 
	
  
 

 
  
	

 
 
	

 
 
	



 


 

 

 
 

 


 


 


 


 


	










 

 




 

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An authenticated voluntary disconnection is given by:

	

 








  




 




 


          
 
This provides evidence that 

initiated voluntary discon-
nection and that all other members of  have seen the
request.
The evidence generated during eviction or voluntary dis-
connection ensures that the remaining members of 
maintain a consistent view of group membership and of
agreed object state. After voluntary disconnection, the dis-
connected member has evidence of the group membership
and agreed object state when they disconnected.
5. B2BObjects API and implementation
This section describes the B2BObjects API and a pro-
totype implementation of the middleware. The prototype
is written in Java using Java RMI for remote invocation.
Two proof-of-concept applications have been developed us-
ing the prototype. Both applications illustrate two-party,
synchronous coordination. However, neither the API, nor
coordination protocols, are specific to this mode of opera-
tion.
The primary B2BObjects API classes are B2BObject —
the application-specific augmentation of a local object, and
B2BObjectController — the local interface to configura-
tion, initiation and control of information sharing. The in-
A is component of B
A B
A implements B
A B
A depends on B
A B
A exports "interface"
A interface
1
«interface»
B2BObject
+setController()
+connect()
+disconnect()
+syncCoord()
+getState()
+getUpdate()
+validateConnect()
+validateDisconnect()
+validateState()
+validateUpdate()
+applyState()
+applyUpdate()
+coordCallback()
ApplicationObject
+getAttribute()
+setAttribute()
+............()
«interface»
B2BObjectController
+connect()
+disconnect()
+syncCoord()
+enter()
+examine()
+overwrite()
+update()
+leave()
+validationResponse()
B2BCoordinatorRemoteB2BCoordinatorLocal
B2BObjectControllerImpl
1
1
1
1
B2BObjectImpl
+getAttribute()
+setAttribute()
+............()
«package»
B2BCoordinator
inter-enterprise coord.
cert. mgt & non-repudiation
state checkpointing
1
Figure 4. B2BObjects API
terfaces to these classes and the relationship between them
and the B2BCoordinator package are shown in Figure 4.
The coordinator package manages inter-organisational con-
nection to and communication between objects, and imple-
ments coordination protocols. It also provides state check-
pointing, certificate management and non-repudiation ser-
vices.
The B2BObject interface is implemented by the appli-
cation programmer. The programmer decides whether to
produce a new application object that implements both the
B2BObject interface and the application logic, or to extend
an existing application object, or to wrap the object with an
implementation of the B2BObject interface. For example,
the ApplicationObject operation:
setAttribute(AType a);
shown in Figure 4 has a corresponding B2BObjectImpl
wrapper operation that could be implemented as follows:
setAttribute(AType a) {
// start of state access
controller.enter();
// indicate overwriting object state
controller.overwrite();
// set the attribute
appObject.setAttribute(a);
// end of state access
controller.leave();
}
Similarly, the B2BObjectImpl getAttribute wrapper
is:
AType getAttribute() {
// start of state access
controller.enter();
// indicate reading object state
controller.examine();
// get the attribute
AType attr = appObject.getAttribute();
// end of state access
controller.leave();
return attr;
}
Given knowledge of an application object’s state access
operations, the wrapper methods of a B2BObjectImpl
class could be generated automatically. As indicated, the
B2BObjectController enter and leave operations are
used to demarcate the scope of access to object state. These
calls may be nested provided that a leave is invoked for
each enter. Nesting allows the application programmer to
“roll-up” a series of state changes into a single coordination
event. If overwrite has been called within the current
state change scope (as in the setAttribute example),
then state coordination is initiated at invocation of the final
leave, as we describe now.
The controller obtains a copy of the object’s state (us-
ing the B2BObject getState operation) and passes that
state to the coordinator for propagation to remote parties
for state validation. B2BCoordinatorLocal provides the fol-
lowing propagation interface :
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public interface B2BCoordinatorLocal {
public void propagateConnect(String
coordAlias);
public void propagateDisconnect(String
subjectAlias);
public void propagateNewState(
NewStateRequest stateRequest);
...
...
}
A call to propagateNewState results in state
validation at the remote parties via invocation of
validateState on their copy of the shared object. The
B2BObjectController validationResponse commu-
nicates the result of this application-specific validation. It
can be invoked synchronously or asynchronously as a call-
back on the local controller. If a proposed change is ac-
cepted by all parties, an applyState call on each replica
installs the newly validated state. Thus the leave opera-
tion implicitly invokes the state coordination protocol, via
the local coordinator, and the validation, or otherwise, of
a state change proposal. If a proposed change is invali-
dated, the proposer’s coordinator will rollback their local
object state using a call to applyState with the previ-
ously agreed state. A similar process to that outlined ap-
plies to update, as opposed to overwrite, of object state.
In this case, the B2BObjectController update operation
is used to indicate the type of state coordination required.
The examine operation indicates that object state will be
read but not written in the current scope. Together with
enter and leave, the three access type indication opera-
tions (examine, overwrite and update) can be used
as hooks for concurrency control mechanisms and transac-
tional access to objects.
The implementation of the B2BObjectController is pro-
vided as part of the middleware. Together, B2BObject
and B2BObjectController provide connection management;
state change scoping and access type indication; and
upcalls for application-level validation. connect and
disconnect operations initiate connection to and dis-
connection from the set of objects being coordinated (lead-
ing to initiation of connection and disconnection proto-
cols via the B2BCoordinatorLocal propagation interface).
validateConnect and validateDisconnect al-
low application-specific validation of connection and dis-
connection requests.
The semantics of connect, disconnect and leave
vary with the communication mode. In synchronous mode,
they block until the relevant coordination process com-
pletes (an exception is raised if validation fails). In
asynchronous mode, they return immediately and comple-
tion is signalled by the coordinator through invocation of
coordCallback. In deferred synchronous mode they re-
turn immediately and a blocking call to coordCommit
can be used to wait for completion. coordCallback
is also used by the coordinator to communicate protocol
progress information to the application.
The B2BCoordinatorLocal interface is indepen-
dent of both the communication mode and the co-
ordination protocols executed between coordinators
through the B2BCoordinatorRemote interface. The
B2BCoordinatorRemote interface is protocol-specific and
cooperating coordinators must export compatible interfaces
to execute a given protocol. The B2BCoordinatorLocal
propagation interface insulates the application from pro-
tocol specific detail. Thus it is possible to configure
the middleware to use different coordination protocols
without altering the application’s interface to coordination.
Implementations of coordinator interfaces are provided
as part of the B2BCoordinator package provided by the
middleware.
We now describe two simple applications that are each
illustrative of a wider class of problem and demonstrate the
adaptability of the middleware to application requirements.
Tic-Tac-Toe is a two-party game in which the players take
turns to modify its shared state according to well-defined,
symmetrically applied rules. Turn-taking access to shared
state is characteristic of other applications such as shared
white boards. The order processing example demonstrates
sharing between two parties according to asymmetric rules.
As described in Section 5.2, it is relatively straightforward
to extend this to involve multiple parties.
5.1. Tic-Tac-Toe application
The aim of a game of Tic-Tac-Toe is to claim a hori-
zontal, vertical or diagonal line of squares before your op-
ponent. Players take turns to play. The rules of the game
are symmetric. For Nought, a vacant square is claimed by
marking it with a zero; Nought cannot mark any square with
a cross; and Nought cannot overwrite an already claimed
square.
An object that implements the B2BObject interface rep-
resents the state of the game and encapsulates the rules.
Servers representing each player share the object and co-
ordinate the object state. A player communicates a move
to their server using their local application client’s “Save”
operation. The servers validate each proposed move (state
change) via the validateState upcall. A validated
move is retrieved by the application client using its “Load”
operation. Apart from encoding the rules of the game, the
application programmer’s task mainly concerns the instanti-
ation of the B2BObjects infrastructure and provision of the
user interface (the “Load” and “Save” operations are part of
this interface and are not mandated by B2BObjects).
Figure 5 shows an example of the Tic-Tac-Toe game
in progress after the following sequence of moves: Cross
claims middle row, centre square; Nought claims top row,
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Figure 5. Tic-Tac-Toe game
left square; Cross claims middle row, right square; then
Cross attempts to mark bottom row, centre square with a
zero. The final move is an attempt by Cross to gain ad-
vantage by pre-empting Nought’s next move. The state
change is invalid and, as can be seen, is not reflected at
Nought’s server. The agreed state of the game has not been
updated and Nought will have evidence of the attempt to
cheat. Cross forfeits the game.
As an alternative to playing the game directly between
two players, it may be desirable to validate moves at a TTP
in order to guarantee that they are encoded and observed
correctly. Figure 6 represents an instance of the game be-
TTP
cn
Nought
n
Cross
c
B2BObjectx Invocation
Application client Object coordination
Player
Trusted third party
Figure 6. Tic-Tac-Toe through a TTP
ing played through a TTP that validates each player’s move
before it is disclosed to their opponent.
5.2. Order processing application
In this application a customer and supplier share the state
of an order. Asymmetric validation rules apply to state
changes. The customer is allowed to add items and the
quantity required to an order but is not allowed to price the
items. The supplier can price items but cannot amend the
order in any other way.
Figure 7. B2BObjects order processing
Figure 7 shows an example of an order being updated.
The customer and supplier each have a replica of an order
object that implements the B2BObject interface. The state
of each replica is coordinated with that of its peer. In the
example, the customer orders 2 widget1s. This is a valid
entry. The supplier then prices widget1 at 10 per unit. The
supplier’s action is validated and reflected in the customer’s
copy of the order. The customer then amends the order for
the supply of 10 widget2s. This entry is validated and re-
flected in the supplier’s copy. Then the supplier attempts to
both price widget2 (a valid action) and change the quantity
required (an invalid action). As can be seen, this update to
the order is rejected and is not reflected in the customer’s
copy.
An alternative instantiation of order processing could in-
volve an approver to sanction the items ordered by the cus-
tomer and a dispatcher to commit to delivery terms. The
order object would then be shared between four parties and
the validation rules modified to reflect their roles.
6. Related work
The problem of fair exchange of information, or items,
of value has received considerable attention recently. A sys-
tem is considered fair if it does not discriminate against a
correctly behaving party. Fair exchange protocols [1, 7, 13]
aim to guarantee fairness during a protocol run or, in the
case of optimistic fair exchange, through an exchange pro-
tocol and associated resolve and abort sub-protocols. All
known fair exchange protocols require either that a TTP is
actively involved or is used to guarantee termination. Pag-
nia et al [10] provide a formal proof of the impossibility
of (strong) fair exchange without a TTP. A distinction can
be made between one-off exchange and information sharing
that is ongoing. It has been shown that relationships that
are characterised by an indefinite series of interactions have
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quantifiable, and often strong, incentives to co-operative be-
haviour [2]. These incentives even hold between antago-
nists. This insight is relevant to the configuration of mid-
dleware support for evolving interaction styles (hinted at in
Section 2 with respect to Figure 1).
The work of Wichert et al [14] is close to our ap-
proach to systematic generation of non-repudiation evi-
dence. They propose the generation of evidence at invo-
cation of “tagged” methods. They provide non-repudiable
RPC but do not address validation of state changes for in-
formation sharing.
Work in the MAFTIA project on distributed trusted com-
puting services [12] is relevant to our plans to investigate the
deployment of the functions and services provided by the
B2BCoordinator package (see Section 5) at a trusted com-
puting base. MAFTIA’s work on tolerating the corruption
of a proportion of participants in agreement protocols [3] is
relevant to protocol termination through majority voting.
In the area of policy-controlled interaction, Ponder [4] is
of interest because of its unified approach to the specifica-
tion of both security and management policy for distributed
object systems. It also allows the import of policy across
administrative domains. The work of Minsky et al on Law
Governed Interaction (LGI) [8] provides an infrastructure
for interaction between parties governed by global policy.
Communication between parties is mediated by agents. An
agent enforces agreed policy as it relates to the party on
whose behalf the agent acts. (The agent role is similar, in ef-
fect, to that of trusted agents in the indirect interaction style
of Figure 1b.) Another approach to the automated control
of interactions through agreements between organisations is
IBM’s tpaML language for business-to-business integration
[5]. Their model of long-running conversations, the state of
which is maintained at each party, is similar to the notion
of shared interaction state. Policy-based approaches can be
seen as complementary to B2BObjects. For example, policy
controlling an interaction could be expressed using Ponder,
LGI or tpaML constructs, and the underlying infrastructure
for regulated information sharing could be instantiated us-
ing B2BObjects.
7. Conclusions and future work
We have presented middleware that addresses the re-
quirement for dependable information sharing between or-
ganisations. The middleware presents the abstraction of
shared state and regulates updates to that state. Safety is
guaranteed even in the presence of misbehaving parties. If
all parties behave correctly, liveness is guaranteed despite
a bounded number of temporary failures. The middleware
presents a familiar programming abstraction to the applica-
tion programmer and frees them to concentrate on the busi-
ness logic of applications.
Our state coordination protocol provides strong guaran-
tees with respect to the validity of decisions reached. It is
also efficient in terms of the number of messages required
($  for  parties) and is straightforward to implement.
These characteristics are achieved in the context of stated
assumptions with respect to failures and, in particular, by
not guaranteeing protocol termination when parties misbe-
have. However, the middleware provides persistence both
of valid state and of protocol messages and, therefore, re-
covery is possible in many circumstances. The inability to
terminate is detectable and may be resolved outside of a
protocol run. This extra-protocol resolution will necessar-
ily involve appeal to a third party or parties (as is the case
for all known fair exchange protocols). If validation de-
pends on the semantics of a state change as interpreted by
any individual party, then it can be argued that no protocol
can guarantee termination (since a decision cannot be made
on that party’s behalf). In which case, a state change can-
not be validated without the participation of all concerned
and ultimately application-level resolution will be required
to compensate for a failure to participate. Thus our proto-
col simply results in earlier invocation of dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, we intend to investigate the impact of relax-
ing failure assumptions (for example: a crashed node not
recovering) and of providing stronger termination guaran-
tees. Approaches to guaranteeing termination include: au-
tomatic resolution or abort by resorting to majority deci-
sion on state changes; and the imposition of deadlines on
decision-making. The imposition of deadlines requires the
involvement of a TTP to guarantee that all honest parties
terminate with the same view of agreed state. In effect, a
TTP would provide certified abort of a protocol run unless a
complete set of responses were available (in which case the
TTP would provide a certified decision derived from those
responses). We intend to develop protocols that use both
on-line and off-line TTPs and where the TTP is constructed
from trusted agents acting on behalf of the participants to an
interaction. The flexibility inherent in the B2BObjects API
allows us to experiment with different instantiations of the
middleware that use different coordination protocols and to
investigate configuration of coordination protocols to suit
application requirements. A merit of the current protocol is
that it is an easily understood base for such investigation.
Future work will also include investigation of sup-
port for concurrency control and transactional access to
B2BObjects; and the use of a wider range of communica-
tions mechanisms. For example, to support loosely-coupled
inter-organisational interaction, we intend to provide im-
plementations of the middleware that are based on Mes-
sage Oriented Middleware and on the use of SMTP and
HTTP/SOAP for message delivery.
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